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We study the relation between households' stock purchases and stock purchases made by their neighbors.
A ten percentage point increase in neighbors' purchases of stocks from an industry is associated with
a two percentage point increase in households' own purchases of stocks from that industry. The effect
is considerably larger for local stocks and among households in more social states. Controlling for
area sociability, households' and neighbors' investment style preferences, and the industry composition
of local firms, we attribute approximately one-quarter to one-half of the correlation between households'
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Despite the fact that individuals collectively hold about one-half of the U.S. stock market, 
information diffusion effects among individual investors—the relation between the investment 
choices made by an individual investor’s neighborhood and the investor’s own investment 
choices—have received relatively little attention in the academic literature, probably because of 
the lack of detailed data. If present, such effects undoubtedly can affect individual investors’ 
asset allocation decisions. Moreover, trades based on information diffusion might be sufficiently 
correlated and condensed in time to affect stock prices. 
In the domain of institutional investors, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) study word-of-
mouth effects among mutual fund managers and find that “…a manager is more likely to hold (or 
buy, or sell) a particular stock in any quarter if other managers in the same city are holding (or 
buying, or selling) that same stock.” This study complements their work by ascertaining whether 
such trading patterns are a broader phenomenon. For example, individual investors may seek to 
reduce search costs and circumvent their lack of expertise by relying on word-of-mouth 
communication with those around them. Indeed, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) present a model 
in which stock market participation may be influenced by social interaction.  Such social 
interaction can serve as a mechanism for information exchange via “word-of-mouth” and/or 
“observational learning” (Banerjee (1992), Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995)). Duflo and Saez 
(2002, 2003) present evidence of peer effects in the context of retirement plans. They find that an 
employee’s participation in retirement plans and choices within those plans are affected by 
participation decisions and choices made by other employees in the same department. 
In the international arena, Feng and Seasholes (2004) present evidence of herding effects 
among individual investors who hold individual brokerage accounts in the People’s Republic of 
China. A unique feature of their data (investors seeking to place trades in person can` do so only 
     1in the brokerage house in which they opened their accounts) enables Feng and Seasholes to 
disentangle word-of-mouth effects from common reaction to releases of public information. 
They find that common reaction to public information (trades placed across branches in the same 
region, local to the company), rather than word-of-mouth effects (trades placed in the same 
branch), seems to be a primary determinant of herding in that context.  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find that proximity to corporate headquarters, the 
language of communication with investors, and the company’s CEO’s cultural origin are 
important determinants of Finnish households’ stock investments. Whereas these findings could 
be consistent with word-of-mouth effects influencing portfolio choice, they could also reflect 
households’ tastes for familiarity—preference to invest in companies that disseminate annual 
financial reports in their native tongues or feature a CEO with the same origin. 
We study information diffusion effects among U.S. individual investors by using a 
detailed data set of common-stock investments 35,673 U.S. households made through a large 
discount brokerage in the period from 1991 to 1996. Throughout the paper, we loosely refer to 
the correlation between households’ investments and their neighbors’ investments as 
“information diffusion.” This term is intended to encapsulate several potential reasons why such 
correlation exists—word-of-mouth effects, similarity in preferences, as well as common local 
reaction to news. To further characterize information diffusion and word-of-mouth effects, we 
consider state-level measures of sociability and find that the level of sociability prevailing in the 
state to which the household belongs (likely a strong correlate of the presence of word-of-mouth 
effects) can explain a significant portion of the overall diffusion effect. Moreover, we 
disentangle the diffusion into the influences of common preferences, structure of the local 
industry, and word-of-mouth effects. 
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Seasholes (2004) delivers a new, richer understanding of the different mechanisms that govern 
individuals’ investment decisions across various societies. Indeed, whereas Feng and Seasholes 
(2004) report that individual investors’ correlated investment decisions are driven by common 
reaction to locally-available news, with no evidence of word-of-mouth effects among Chinese 
investors, our estimates suggest that word-of-mouth effects among U.S. investors are strong, 
particularly in more social areas. This discrepancy is consistent with the differences in the 
fundamental characteristics of the two societies. Freedom House, which has been producing 
annual ratings of political and civil rights for more than 200 countries for the past three decades 
(Freedom House (2004)), has ranked the U.S. among the highest and the People’s Republic of 
China among the lowest along the dimension of civil liberties. An essential ingredient of the civil 
liberties score is prevalence of open and free discussion (or absence thereof). Coupled with the 
fact that many, if not most companies in the People’s Republic of China are at least partly 
government-owned, it is very plausible that exchanging investment-relevant information in a 
society deprived of open and free discussion and many other civil liberties is rare and modest.  
Even within the U.S., there is variation in sociability (e.g., membership in clubs, trust in 
other people). If word-of-mouth is an important contributor to households’ stock purchases, the 
observed correlation in a household’s portfolio allocation and that of its neighbors should be 
higher in the more social areas. Other explanations for information diffusion effects, such as 
correlated preferences and common local reaction to news, should not vary with the sociability 
of the community. Using state-level variation in sociability measures enables us to differentiate 
among the competing hypotheses that can explain trading patterns of U.S. investors. 
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percentage point increase in purchases of stocks from an industry made by a household’s 
neighbors is associated with an increase of two percentage points in the household’s own 
purchases of stocks from that industry. We pay particular attention to the differentiation between 
information diffusion effects related to local stocks (defined as companies headquartered within 
50 miles from the household) and the effects related to non-local stocks. Whereas the key 
neighborhood effects—similarity in preferences, the impact of the structure of the local industry, 
and word-of-mouth—can prevail among the investments both local and non-local to the 
household, most of those effects will likely be far more pronounced among local investments 
because, as demonstrated for both professional money managers (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)) 
and individual investors (Ivković and Weisbenner (2005)), the flow of value-relevant 
information regarding local companies appears to be higher and of better quality than the 
comparable flow regarding remote, non-local companies.  
Not surprisingly, we indeed find that information diffusion effects are considerably 
stronger for local purchases than for non-local ones. For example, if the neighborhood’s 
allocation of local purchases to a particular industry increases by ten percentage points, a 
household tends to increase its own allocation of local purchases to the industry by a comparable 
amount. This result adds another dimension to the already documented high degrees of 
individual investors’ locality, both in the U.S. (Ivković and Weisbenner (2005), Zhu (2002)) and 
abroad (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Massa and Simonov (2006)): not only do investors tend 
disproportionately to invest locally, but there are also strong information diffusion effects in their 
neighborhood. 
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with the population of the household’s community. Such diffusion in stock trading affects 
individual investors’ asset allocation decisions. For example, although residents in larger 
metropolitan areas have substantially more diverse investment opportunities and tend to invest 
more in local stocks, we find that their local stock investments tend to remain just as 
concentrated as those made by residents of less populated communities (who have a significantly 
smaller pool of potential local investments). This tendency is consistent with the notion that 
residents in more populous geographic areas might be exposed to word-of-mouth effects to a 
higher degree than residents in less highly populated areas. 
Finally, to disentangle the contributions of correlated preferences and the structure of the 
local economy to the observed correlation between individual investors’ stock purchases and 
those of their neighbors from “word-of-mouth” effects, we conduct two tests. First, we consider 
the level of sociability of the state to which the household belongs and find that the relation 
between industry-level household purchases and neighborhood purchases is substantially 
stronger among households in the more sociable states. Second, we consider the households’ 
own preferences (as revealed by the composition of their respective portfolios across industries 
at the beginning of each quarter), preferences of the households’ respective neighborhoods (as 
revealed by the composition of the neighborhoods’ aggregate portfolios), as well as the 
composition of local firms and workers by industry. We find that one-quarter to one-half of the 
overall diffusion effect among both local and non-local investments cannot be attributed to these 
sources. We regard the remaining portions of the diffusion effect as a conservative lower bound 
on the impact of word-of-mouth communication effects on household trading decisions. 
Disentangling the overall information diffusion effect into word-of mouth communication and 
     5other diffusion effects potentially yields further insight as to how correlated trading among 
individuals may influence stock prices.  
Our results complement and extend those of Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), suggesting 
that word-of-mouth effects are a broad phenomenon that affects financial decisions made by both 
mutual fund managers and individual investors. The two studies provide evidence supportive of 
word-of-mouth effects using different techniques, thereby adding to the robustness of the overall 
finding. Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) rule out alternative explanations for correlated trading 
patterns by examining trading activity before and after Regulation FD and by focusing on trades 
in stocks for which investor relations are unlikely to be a contributing factor (stocks not local to 
the managers and small stocks). In this paper, we disentangle possible explanations for correlated 
trading patterns by exploiting differences in sociability of communities across the U.S., as well 
as introducing several controls for similarity in investment preferences within the community (as 
manifested by previous household investment decisions) and the composition of the local 
economy. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data and 
summary statistics. We present our basic findings concerning information diffusion, the impact 
of the size of the population residing in the household’s community, and dissipation of diffusion 
effects with distance from the household in Section 2. We examine the role of sociability and 
identify the contributions of correlated preferences, the structure of the local economy, and 
word-of-mouth communication to overall diffusion in individuals’ investment choices in Section 
3. Section 4 concludes. 
     61. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
1.1 Data 
The primary data set, obtained from a large discount broker, consists of individual investors’ 
monthly positions and trades over a six-year period from 1991 to 1996. It covers the investments 
that 78,000 households made through the discount broker, including common stocks, mutual 
funds, and other securities. Each household could have as few as one and as many as 21 accounts 
(the median number of accounts per household is two). The information associated with each 
trade includes the account in which the trade was made. A separate data file contains the 
information associated with each account, including the household to which the account belongs. 
This structure of the data allows us to associate with each trade the household that made it. For 
further details see Barber and Odean (2000). 
In this paper we focus on the common stocks traded on the NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq 
exchanges. Common stock investments constitute roughly three-quarters of the total value of 
household investments through the brokerage house in the sample. We use the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database to obtain information on stock prices and returns 
and COMPUSTAT to obtain several firm characteristics, including company headquarters 
location (identified by its state and county codes). We use the headquarters location as opposed 
to the state of incorporation because firms often do not have the majority of their operations in 
their state of incorporation.
1
We exclude the stocks that we could not match with CRSP and COMPUSTAT; they were 
most likely listed on smaller exchanges. We also exclude stocks not headquartered in the 
continental U.S.  The resulting “market”—the universe of stocks about which we could obtain 
the necessary characteristics and information—is representative of the overall market. For 
     7example, at the end of 1991 the “market” consists of 5,478 stocks that cover 89% of the overall 
market capitalization at the time. 
The sample of households used in this study is a subset of the entire collection of 
households for which we could ascertain their zip code and thus determine their location. We 
obtained the latitude and longitude for each of the zip codes from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database. Company locations come from the COMPUSTAT 
Annual Research Files, which contain the information regarding company headquarters’ county 
codes. Finally, we identify the latitude and longitude for each county from the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s Gazetteer Place and Zip Code Database as well. We use the standard formula for 
computing the distance d(a,b) in statutory miles between two points a and b as follows: 
d(a,b) = arccos{cos(a1)cos(a2)cos(b1)cos(b2)+cos(a1)sin(a2)cos(b1)sin(b2)+sin(a1)sin(b1)} r,       (1) 
where a1 and b1 (a2 and b2) are the latitudes (longitudes) of the two points (expressed in radians), 
respectively, and r denotes the radius of the Earth (approximately 3,963 statutory miles). 
The sample size necessitates two adjustments. First, instead of fitting regressions based 
on individual stocks we aggregate all the buys in each quarter by assigning firms to one of the 
following 14 industry groups based on their SIC codes:  mining, oil and gas, construction, food, 
basic materials, medical/biotechnology, manufacturing, transportation, telecommunications, 
utilities, retail/wholesale trade, finance, technology, and services. Moreover, although 35,673 
households purchased common stocks at some point during the sample period, in each quarter 
we consider only the households that made some purchases during the quarter. In sum, there are 
23 complete quarters in the sample period (1991:1 to 1996:3), 14 industries, and 7,000 to 9,000 
households that made stock purchases in a quarter. This leads to a total of 2,678,004 
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quarter dummy variables (14 industries x 23 quarters). 
In most analyses, we relate the industry composition of a household’s purchases during a 
quarter to the industry composition of all the purchases of the household’s neighbors (households 
located within 50 miles) made during the quarter, plus appropriate controls. We choose this 
distance because there is evidence that 50 miles captures most of one’s social interactions.
2
Finally, in some analyses we relate the extent of information diffusion to the sociability 
that prevails in the area surrounding the household. To capture sociability, we use state-level 
values of the Comprehensive Social Capital Index, as collected and presented in Putnam (2000).
3 
We classify households according to their state’s Comprehensive Social Capital Index and split 
the sample of households into sociable and non-sociable ones, where the breakpoint is the 
sociability measure of the median household in the sample.
4
1.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes quarterly household stock purchases at the industry level. Summary 
statistics are reported annually, as well as for the entire sample period (bottom row of the table). 
The first column presents the number of household-quarter-industry (h, t, i) combinations in a 
given year such that household h made at least one purchase in quarter t in industry i. The second 
column tallies the number of distinct households appearing in the sample in a given year. The 
third column lists average dollar values of households’ quarterly purchases, where median values 
are reported in parentheses underneath the mean values. The last column breaks down the 
purchases according to their distances from the household (i.e., whether the firm headquarters is 
located within 50 miles of the household). There are a total of 191,286 “purchases”—household-
quarter-industry (h, t, i) combinations for which there was a purchase by household h in quarter t 
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distinct households throughout the sample period. The distribution of the dollar values of 
quarterly purchases is skewed; whereas the mean quarterly purchase was around $29,000, the 
median value was substantially smaller, around $8,000. The fourth column shows individual 
investors’ disproportionate preference for local stocks (17.1% of all purchases), a phenomenon 
studied in Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) and Zhu (2002). 
2. Information Diffusion Effects 
2.1 Basic Regression Specification 
We begin by classifying individual stock purchases made by household h in quarter t into 
industries i = 1, 2, … , 14 and compute fh,t,i, the dollar-weighted share of a household’s quarterly 
buys in each industry.
5 In various analyses, the aggregation into 14 industries is done across all 
stock purchases, local purchases only, and non-local purchases only. Moreover, for each 
household h and each quarter t we also compute  , i = 1, 2, … , 14, that is, the proportion 
of buys made by all neighboring households within 50 miles from household h (excluding 
household h) in each of the 14 industries. For presentational convenience, throughout the paper 
the household industry shares f
50
, , i t h F−
h,t,i are expressed in percentage points (that is, they are multiplied 
by 100), whereas neighboring household industry shares are not. Finally, we employ industry-
quarter effects to allow for market-wide variation in demand across industries and time by 
defining 322 dummy variables Dt,i, t = 1, …, 23 (from quarter 1991:1 to 1996:3), and i = 1, 2, … 
, 14. These controls ensure that our results are not driven by, for example, technology stocks 
beating analysts’ expectations, which belong to the common information set that may affect 
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purchase technology stocks across different communities. In sum, the basic regression is: 
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For the basic specification without controls other than the 322 dummy variables, the null 
hypothesis is that information diffusion effects (“neighborhood effects”) do not exist, that is, that 
the coefficient β is zero. A positive β would suggest the presence of information diffusion 
effects. 
We next address the correlation structure of the error term: observations are independent 
neither within each household-quarter combination (industry shares necessarily need to add up to 
one) nor across time (households’ preferences are unlikely to change at quarterly frequency). It 
follows that the OLS regression estimation, although consistent, would produce biased standard 
errors. Thus, we report the standard errors and resulting tests of statistical significance based 
upon a robust estimator that clusters observations at the household-quarter level for all 
regressions. 
There are several reasons why U.S. individuals’ investment choices might be related to 
those made by their neighbors. At the outset, we note that individual investors might be reacting 
to the same publicly available information to which their neighbors are reacting. Such tendencies 
may cause correlated trading. Indeed, Barber, Odean, and Zhu (2006) document that trading 
patterns are correlated across individual investors and Barber and Odean (2005) find that 
individual investors are inclined to buy stocks that have attracted attention. These correlated 
trading patterns are not necessarily surprising in light of exposure to (the same) publicly 
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1998), tax-motivated trading (Ivković, Poterba, and Weisbenner (2005)), or other behavioral 
phenomena that might prevail among individual investors, yet need not be driven by information 
diffusion effects. Our basic set of 322 industry-quarter dummy variables seeks to control for 
these and other trading factors that do not vary across communities (e.g., when a stock price 
reaches an all-time high, it does so for all investors) and thereby to allow our specifications to 
pick up information diffusion effects. 
2.2 Information Diffusion Effects for Purchases 
We present the results of fitting the regression from Equation (2) in Panel A of Table 2. Within 
the panel, each row pertains to a different dependent variable. The first row of the panel pertains 
to the industry share breakdown fh,t,i computed across all buys. Running the basic regression, 
without any controls other than the 322 industry-quarter dummies, produces the highly 
statistically significant estimate of 20.7 and thus suggests that a 10 percentage point change in 
the neighbors’ allocation of purchases in an industry is associated with a nearly 2.1 percentage 
point change in the household’s own allocation of purchases in the industry.
6
As discussed in the introduction, information diffusion that prevails among local and 
non-local stocks may be different. Similarity in preferences, the structure of the local industry, 
and word-of-mouth effects are likely stronger among local investments. This inquiry is also 
motivated by studies of local bias among both institutional investors (Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999)) and individual investors (Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) and Zhu (2002)). These studies 
find that both groups of investors are biased toward holding disproportionately more local stocks 
in their portfolios. Moreover, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) 
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managers and individual investors, respectively. 
Separate consideration of local purchases
7 and non-local purchases, reported in the next 
two rows of Table 2, Panel A, indeed reveals that local information diffusion effects are larger 
than the non-local ones by an order of magnitude (119.3 vs. 8.4). For example, if the 
neighborhood’s allocation of purchases to a particular industry increases by ten percentage 
points, a household tends to increase its own allocation of local purchases to the industry by a 
comparable amount. This result adds another dimension to the already documented high degrees 
of individual investors’ locality, both in the U.S. (Ivković and Weisbenner (2005), Zhu (2002)) 
and overseas (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001), Massa and Simonov (2006)), by suggesting the 
possibility that strong information diffusion effects could contribute to individual investors’ local 
bias. 
2.3 Information Diffusion Effects for Sales and Positions 
In Panels B and C of Table 2 we also examine the extent to which households’ sale and holding 
decisions are correlated with those of their neighbors. We find a similar pattern of results for sale 
decisions as we do for purchase decisions. For example, estimates from Panel B suggest that a 10 
percentage point change in the neighbors’ sales of stock in an industry is associated with a 3.0 
percentage point change in the household’s own sales of stock in the industry.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, the correlation between the composition of a household’s 
positions across industries and that of their neighbors is substantially larger than those for 
purchases (the coefficients are larger in magnitude by 50% to 100% across the three samples). 
This larger correlation reflects the fact that positions are the combination of both past purchase 
decisions and the returns accrued on those investments. The larger correlation for positions 
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Stein (2005). 
For the remainder of the paper, we focus on households’ purchase decisions because they 
are unconstrained, that is, households are free to purchase any stock, and they represent 
households’ active financial decisions. By contrast, in the absence of short selling, sale decisions 
are limited to the stocks already held (essentially no investors in our sample sold stocks short). 
Thus, a correlation in selling activity could simply represent an underlying correlation in the 
original buying activity of those stocks. Moreover, a correlation in positions could in part simply 
reflect households’ inertia, as households could hold similar stocks over a long period of time 
(and thus experience similar movements in the value of their portfolio positions).
8
2.4 Information Diffusion Effects and Local Population Size 
In this section we stratify households according to the size of the population that resides within 
50 miles from the household. We define four categories: 0-1 million residents, 1-2.5 million 
residents, 2.5-5 million residents, and more than 5 million residents. Not surprisingly, the size of 
the local population and the diversity of local companies are positively related (i.e., local 
population and the Herfindahl index of industry concentration are negatively correlated). 
Specifically, the Herfindahl index of the industry composition of firms local to the average 
household decreases from around 0.5 to around 0.2 as the population increases from 0-1 million 
local residents to more than 5 million local residents.
9 Yet, although the average dollar amount 
of quarterly purchases of local individual stocks increases from $13,000 to $22,400 as the size of 
the local population increases from 0-1 million to more than 5 million local residents, the 
Herfindahl index of households’ local purchases across industries remains virtually unchanged—
it drops only very slightly from 0.99 to 0.95. Thus, although residents in larger metropolitan 
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stocks, they tend to remain very focused in their industry allocation. This tendency is consistent 
with the notion that residents in more populous geographic areas might be exposed to 
information diffusion effects to a higher degree than residents in less highly populated areas. To 
confirm this intuition, we run a simple modification of the basic regression from Equation (2) on 
subsamples selected by the type of purchase (all buys, local buys, and non-local buys) wherein 
information diffusion effects are interacted with indicator variables representing local population 
size (0-1 million, 1-2.5 million, 2.5-5 million, more than 5 million). The coefficient estimate 
presented in the table for a particular population group represents the total information diffusion 
effect for that group (i.e., the sum of the diffusion effect for the 0-1 million group and the 
interaction term for that particular population group). 
Across all three regressions presented in Table 3, information diffusion effects in 
purchases increase with population size. Stronger effects in larger metropolitan areas may stem 
from a greater flow of investment-relevant information through increased availability of 
information sources (e.g., business-oriented magazines and newspapers) and advertising efforts, 
both of which are subject to economies of scale and are typically more substantial in larger 
metropolitan areas. 
2.5 Dissipation of Information Diffusion Effects with Distance from the Household 
One would expect information diffusion effects to dissipate as the distance from the household 
increases. To test this hypothesis, we define regions surrounding the household at increasingly 
larger distances as follows: 0-50 miles, 50-70.7 miles, 70.7-86.6 miles, 86.6-100 miles, … , 
141.4-150 miles. These regions each cover a geographic area of the same size (50
2 π = 7,854 
square miles). We then run a regression similar to Equation (2), except, instead of having one 
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,  ,  ,  ,  ,  , and  ). The results are 
presented graphically in Figure 1. Across all three panels, that is, for all buys, local buys, and 
non-local buys, the pattern is the same: there is a rapid and fairly steady exponential decline of 
the information diffusion coefficients with distance from the household. As one might suspect, a 
household’s purchases of non-local stocks are relatively more sensitive to the decisions made by 
members of more distant communities than its purchases of local stocks are. That is, going 
beyond the 50-mile community leads to a substantially faster decline in information diffusion 
effects in the domain of local stocks than in the domain of non-local stocks. 
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2.6 Robustness Checks 
An issue of potential concern for local information diffusion is that the effect might be driven by 
some form of inside trading: those who work for a company may be trading in their own 
company stock and may be selectively releasing pertinent information to their relatives and close 
friends. We regard this effect as somewhat distinct from the other aspects of information 
diffusion because the information the investors would receive is likely much more precise than 
the information available through word-of-mouth effects, exposure to local news, influence of 
company’s presence through advertising efforts, company-sponsored events, or social interaction 
with company employees. 
Unfortunately, the data set does not provide information about the investors’ current and 
past employers. We control for the own-company stock explanation, however, by focusing on the 
plausible assumption that, if a household’s local purchase is motivated by inside information, it 
is likely to be the household’s largest local trade in that quarter. Accordingly, we compute for 
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largest stock purchase made by household h in quarter t. In unreported analyses, we find that this 
specification yields estimates of the local information diffusion effect that are even somewhat 
larger than the estimates based on the full sample of local investments (152.5 versus 119.3). 
Therefore, we do not find evidence that trading in own-company stock drives the estimated 
information diffusion effects among local investments. 
Another issue of potential concern is that the estimates of local information diffusion may 
be induced by the dominant presence of a company (or industry) in a household’s neighborhood. 
Taking a drastic example, suppose there is only one company (or multiple companies all 
belonging to the same industry) local to the household. The opportunity set for local investments 
is therefore very focused and the inability to invest locally into any other industry may bias the 
results. To assess the impact of industry dominance in the local opportunity set, in unreported 
analyses we estimate regressions for local purchases on a subsample of purchases—household-
quarter-industry (h,t,i) combinations for which the weight of industry i in the portfolio of firms 
local to household h does not exceed the threshold of 50%, that is, the observations not plagued 
by the domination of a single company (or industry) in the community. The regression 
coefficient remains essentially the same; it declines only very slightly, from 119.3 to 111.3, 
which suggests that the “one-company town” issue does not drive local information diffusion. 
3. Disentangling Information Diffusion Effects 
The results presented in Section 2 suggest that the stock purchases made by households are 
strongly related to those made by their neighbors, consistent with word-of-mouth effects playing 
a strong role in household investment decisions. However, such a correlation in trading activity 
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firms. In regard to U.S. investors, studies have found correlated trading patterns both for 
institutional investors (Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005)) and individual investors (Barber, Odean, 
and Zhu (2006)). Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) consider alternative interpretations to their 
finding that mutual fund managers engage in word-of-mouth communication and tilt their 
portfolios accordingly. They use three sets of tests to assess the possibility that their results are 
driven by inside information obtained by the money managers directly from company executives 
(which they tem the “local-investor-relations” activity). First, their results are unaffected even if 
all local stocks are excluded from their regressions. Second, their results are robust among 
smaller stocks (which, on average, have fewer resources at their disposal to pursue “local-
investor-relations” activities). Finally, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) consider the post-
Regulation FD period and show that their results persist in the aftermath of explicit regulation 
that prohibits companies to engage in selective dissemination of information, suggesting once 
again that “local-investor-relations” strategies do not drive their regression results. 
As Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005) point out, none of these “local-investor-relations” 
alternative explanations are likely to dominate the arena of individual investors. In fact, Feng and 
Seasholes (2004) report that Chinese individual investors’ correlated investment decisions are 
driven by common reaction to locally-available news, with no evidence of word-of-mouth effects 
on stock trades. However, given the differences in the fundamental characteristics of the U.S. 
and Chinese societies (i.e., differences in civil liberties such as open and free discussion), it is 
plausible that motivations for stock purchases could also be substantially different across the two 
cultures. 
     18Moreover, it is important to differentiate among competing sources of the overall 
information diffusion effect among U.S. individual investors because they likely have different 
levels of influence on the market. For example, word-of-mouth effects may create a more 
dynamic exchange of information that may lead to a ripple effect of further information 
dissemination, which in turn may have an impact on stock prices. 
Thus, we devise two alternative strategies to disentangle the sources of the observed 
correlation between a household’s stock purchases and those of its neighbors. The first strategy 
considers the sociability of a household’s state. Using the comprehensive state-wide sociability 
measure from Putnam (2000) (available for all 50 states except Alaska and Hawaii), we assign a 
certain level of sociability to every household in our sample, and then define a dummy variable 
associated with each household that labels it as a household in either a high or a low sociability 
area. We interact that dummy variable with the neighborhoods’ industry-level purchases. Within 
the United States, there is variation in sociability (i.e., membership in clubs, trust in other people, 
etc.) across states. If word-of-mouth is an important contributor to a household’s stock 
purchases, then the observed correlation in a household’s portfolio allocation and that of their 
neighbors should be higher in more social areas. Other explanations for information diffusion 
effects, such as correlated preferences and common local reaction to news, should not vary with 
the sociability of the community. We interpret the coefficients associated with sociability, which 
represent the increased influence of neighbors’ investment choices on an individual’s own 
portfolio in social areas relative to less social communities, as measures of the word-of-mouth 
effects.  
The second strategy considers three key contributions to the overall information diffusion 
effect, namely, word-of-mouth communication, correlated preferences (which may incorporate 
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composition of the neighborhood’s aggregate portfolio to reveal the neighborhood’s preferences 
and the accumulation of their reactions to past news. Analogously, we use the composition of a 
household’s own portfolio position to reveal its own preferences and accumulated reactions to 
past news. We further use the degree of conformity of the household portfolio composition to the 
portfolio composition of the neighborhood to identify households with preferences and reactions 
similar to their neighbors’, as well as those whose preferences and reactions are very different 
from their neighbors’. Upon controlling for the composition of households’ neighborhood 
portfolios and households’ own portfolio compositions, as well as the structure of the local 
economy, we view the correlation between the household’s stock purchases and those of its 
neighbors that survives such rigid controls as a conservative lower bound on the magnitude of 
the word-of-mouth effect.  
Strikingly, our estimates of the contribution of word-of-mouth communication are very 
similar across households that conformed to their neighbors very closely and those that held very 
disparate portfolios. This finding is reassuring because it suggests that the strategy we employed 
to control for the effect of common preferences and the cumulative common reactions to news 
did not lead to materially different estimates of the word-of-mouth effect across the two sets of 
households. 
3.1 Controlling for Word-of-Mouth Effects: The Area Sociability Proxy 
In this section we report the results of the analyses in which we identify a proxy for the word-of-
mouth effect and interact that measure with diffusion coefficients in a regression specification 
very similar to that from Equation (2). Our proxy for the word-of-mouth effect is the sociability 
of the area surrounding a household. To capture sociability, we use state-level values of the 
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10 We define a 
dummy variable that indicates high and low area sociability levels by classifying households 
according to their state’s Comprehensive Social Capital Index (Putnam, 2000) and splitting the 
households into sociable and non-sociable ones (the breakpoint is the sociability measure of the 
median household in the sample). Further recognizing that sociability effects may be stronger in 
the areas with more population, we also develop a specification in which we interact the 
diffusion coefficient with both the sociability dummy and the population measures (as defined in 
Section 2.4 and Table 3). 
  Table 4 presents the results of both analyses across all buys, local buys, and non-local 
buys (Panels A, B, and C, respectively). Within each panel, the first section reports regression 
results for specifications involving area sociability measures only, whereas the second section 
reports results of the more complicated specifications that also include interactions with 
population measures. 
Focusing first on the specifications without population interactions, diffusion effects are 
considerably stronger among households located in the more sociable areas. A ten percentage 
point increase in neighbors’ purchases of stocks from an industry is associated with a 1.5 
percentage point increase in the household’s own purchases of stocks from that industry in non-
social areas, while the diffusion effect increases to 2.5 percentage points for households in social 
states. Thus, the correlation in household purchases is significantly stronger in the states that are 
more sociable (i.e., in the states in which individuals are more inclined, for example, to be 
members of clubs and to trust each other). For all buys and non-local buys, the increased 
influence of neighbors’ investment choices on an individual’s own portfolio in more social areas 
relative to less social areas (a proxy for the word-of-mouth effect) is 40% (10.0/24.6 and 3.0/9.8, 
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of the total correlation between neighborhood and household purchases is 17% (20.1/119). 
Specifications that also incorporate population interactions yield similar relative increases 
across all population groups, with the exception of the households located in the smallest 
communities (surrounded by fewer than 1 million people within a 50-mile radius), for which 
increased sociability does not translate into any statistically significant changes in information 
diffusion. Parallel to the results from Table 3, the correlation in stock picks increases with the 
increase of population, and, broadly speaking, so does the incremental contribution of area 
sociability (the coefficients in the bottom row of each of the six analyses reported in Table 4). 
These results suggest that word-of-mouth communication is an important contributor to 
information diffusion effects, amounting to perhaps one to two-fifths of the overall correlation 
between individual and community stock purchases. 
3.2 Controlling for Correlated Preferences and Structure of Local Economy 
3.2.1 The Role of Correlated Preferences A potential source of correlated purchases among 
households in a geographic area is that those households may have similar preferences. 
Individual investors might be influenced by their neighbors’ investment choices because they 
wish to conform and keep pace with their neighbors’ wealth and investment habits (Bernheim 
(1994), Campbell and Cochrane (1999), and Shore and White (2003)). Moreover, to the extent 
that individuals choose their place of residence according to their preferences, and those tend to 
be correlated among the residents of the same geographic area, it is possible that similar tastes 
might govern investment decisions even without explicit communication with their neighbors. 
Finally, it is plausible that individual investors’ own preferences are correlated over time; 
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(e.g., favoring stocks from the same industry as they previously did). 
  To explore the effect of correlated preferences, we define two variables for each (h, t) 
observation. First, we define the industry composition of stock positions of neighboring 
households (excluding household h itself) at the end of quarter t–1. Second, we define the 
industry composition of stock positions of the household itself at the end of quarter t–1. The 
inclusion of these two position-related variables in the specification explicitly accounts for any 
underlying correlation in trading activity attributable to a similarity in preferences within a 
community that manifests itself in a similarity of stock purchases within the community or a 
similarity in an individual’s own stock preferences over time. This approach requires merging 
purchases in quarter t with positions at the end of quarter t–1. Although there is substantial 
overlap between household identifiers for trades and positions in the database, the matching is 
imperfect and it allowed us to retain around two-thirds of the original observations used in 
previous analyses. 
3.2.2 The Structure of the Local Economy Companies routinely seek to generate a certain 
presence in the local community. One immediate effect of such endeavors is investors’ enhanced 
familiarity with local companies, generated through social interaction with employees and 
company efforts such as local advertising and sponsoring local events. Investors’ propensity to 
invest in the companies (industries) they are familiar with, and perhaps even informed about, 
undoubtedly constitutes one important facet of information diffusion. Moreover, the local 
presence of a company may enhance the probability of circulation of very precise, inside 
information, an issue we addressed to a certain extent in Section 2.  
     23To capture the impact of the structure of the local economy, we define variables that 
characterize the distribution of the local economy and local labor force across industries. 
Specifically, for each (h, t, i) observation we define two variables: the fraction of market value of 
publicly-traded companies local to household h in quarter t in industry i and the fraction of the 
labor force local to household h in quarter t employed in industry i.
11
Including these two variables should pick up both the effects that stem from familiarity 
with local companies and the potential direct company-stock effect. For example, if there are 
many employees working for construction companies in the area, a household’s propensity to 
invest in construction firms could stem from word-of-mouth effects—social interaction between 
these employees and other households—or from those employees’ propensity to invest in their 
own company stock (company-stock effects). 
3.2.3 The Results The results of relating the industry composition of a household’s investments 
to the neighborhood’s preferences, the household’s own preferences, and the structure of the 
local economy are presented in Table 5. Panel A has three sections, containing estimates for all 
buys, local buys, and non-local buys, respectively. Within each section, we first show the 
baseline result, which corresponds very closely with the corresponding baseline result in Table 2, 
Panel A.
12 The following row in each section shows the results with the two additional 
independent variables that capture preferences for industry allocation. Both variables are 
statistically significant, which suggests that households’ purchases across industries are related to 
the common preferences that prevail in their neighborhoods, as well as their own revealed 
preferences (as described by their current stock positions). For example, the point estimates 
suggest that households entering the quarter with a stock portfolio fully concentrated in a 
particular industry allocate 31 to 48 percentage points more of their quarterly purchases to that 
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to such preferences (i.e., the word-of-mouth component), is equal to one-half of the magnitude of 
the estimated effect of the overall information diffusion for all buys and non-local buys, and to 
one-third for local buys.  
  The third row in each section of Panel A includes the variables that capture the structure 
of the local economy. Both local-economy variables are positively related to the allocation of 
household purchases across industries and are statistically significant, although they tend to 
attenuate the estimate of β to a much lesser degree than the two variables related to preferences. 
Whereas the effect of the structure of the local economy is present for all the subsamples, the 
impact is by far the strongest for local buys. Specifically, a 10 percentage point change in the 
presence of a certain industry (as measured by firm values) is associated with a 4.7 percentage 
point change in the allocation of a local household’s local purchases across industries. The 
impact of the industry-level structure of the local labor force is also noticeable (1.4 percentage 
point change), though it is not as strong. The higher correlations of the local economy variables 
with local buys could partially reflect company-stock issues, namely, the propensity to invest in a 
firm for which household members work (or have worked). On the other hand, the significant 
correlations of the local economy variables with non-local buys likely do not reflect this concern; 
instead, they likely reflect the notion that households’ familiarity with local investment 
opportunities influences households’ non-local investments as well.  
The fourth row in each section features the results of relating the industry composition of 
a household’s investments to both preferences (the neighborhood’s and the household’s own) 
and the structure of the local economy. Estimates of the effects of all the four variables are 
positive and statistically significant. Most importantly, the point estimate of β, interpreted as the 
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approximately equals one-half of the magnitude of the estimated effect of the overall information 
diffusion for all buys and non-local buys, and one-third for local buys.
13  
The final analysis reported in Panel A of Table 5 seeks to capture differences among 
households along unobservable characteristics by running the baseline regression from Equation 
(2) with the inclusion of household-industry-level fixed effects. This is a very rigorous test 
because it presents a higher standard than the baseline specification: it relates the change in a 
household’s allocation of purchases to an industry from its time-series average allocation of 
purchases to the industry with the change in its neighborhood’s allocation of purchases to the 
industry from the neighborhood’s time series average allocation of purchases to the industry. For 
example, an investor who likes technology stocks may happen to live in an area in which others 
independently also happen to invest in technology stocks. Such a non-causal correlation would 
lead toward the detection of diffusion effects in a cross-sectional regression even if investors 
acted independently. By contrast, to identify diffusion effects in a panel regression requires that, 
in response to a change in community technology stock investment, the household should change 
its allocation to technology stocks in the same direction. Results in the last row of each section in 
Panel A suggest that information diffusion effects remain strong in the household fixed-effects 
framework, especially for local buys (3.6 for all buys; 17.7 for local buys; 2.4 for non-local 
buys), though the magnitudes are substantially reduced compared to the cross-sectional analyses. 
  The extent to which households’ portfolios conform to those of their neighbors can serve 
as a proxy for identifying households whose purchasing decisions are driven to varying degrees 
by the desire to adhere (inadvertently or not) to the preferences and common news prevailing in 
their neighborhood. For example, if a household shared the investment preferences with its 
     26neighborhood and responded to news similarly to the way its neighborhood did, over time its 
portfolio composition would be very similar to that of its community. 
We sort households into two types according to the extent to which their household 
portfolio allocations at the industry level conform to those of their neighbors; the metric we use 
is the average absolute deviation in industry portfolio shares between a household and its 
neighborhood. Results in Panels B and C of Table 5 suggest that, whereas initially there are 
substantial differences in information diffusion effects (i.e., coefficients associated with the 
composition of buys of neighboring households) across the two groups, once the variables that 
capture preferences and the structure of the local economy are included in the regression, the 
estimated coefficient β (i.e., the relation between a household’s purchases and its neighbors’ 
purchases) becomes fairly similar across the two types of investors. Specifically, the β for local 
(non-local) buys across the two groups of investors are 46.2 and 29.4 (3.9 and 2.9), respectively, 
and are no longer significantly different at the 1% level. This suggests that the two positions-
related variables indeed are successful in capturing the effect of common preferences because, 
once they are included in the specification, the remaining information diffusion effect, which we 
attribute to word-of-mouth communication, is very comparable across investors who have stock 
portfolios very similar to their neighbors and those whose portfolios are quite different from their 
neighbors’. 
3.3 Unifying the Two Approaches to Information Diffusion Effect Attribution 
The previous two sections each approached the task of assessing the contribution of word-of-
mouth effects to the overall correlation between individual and community stock purchases from 
a different angle. Remarkably, the estimates of that contribution qualitatively are in close 
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half of the overall diffusion effect. 
  In unreported results, we fit a specification that unites the two approaches: coefficients 
from the full specification from the previous section (including the neighborhoods’ purchases, 
neighborhoods’ positions, household positions, structure of local firms’ market value, and 
structure of the local labor force) are interacted with the dummy variable capturing 
neighborhoods’ sociability used in Section 3.1. For the subsample of all buys, for example, the 
coefficient associated with buys of neighboring households from Table 5, 9.0, translates into 6.1 
among households located in less sociable neighborhoods and 11.2 among households located in 
more sociable neighborhoods. 
There also is a stark contrast between the impact of area sociability on the coefficients 
associated with the structure of local firm market value (as defined by the share of market 
capitalization of local firms across the 14 industries) and those associated with the structure of 
the local labor force (as defined by the share of employees across the 14 industries in the area). 
Whereas high area sociability reduces the importance of the share of local firm market value in a 
particular industry on household investment choice, it increases the influence of the fraction of 
local employees in a particular industry. Among households in less sociable states, the fraction of 
local firm market value in a particular industry is a more important predictor of the fraction of a 
household’s stock purchases in that same industry than the local employee share is. However, 
among households in more sociable states, the fraction of local firm market value in a particular 
industry is uncorrelated with the fraction of a household’s stock purchases in that same industry, 
whereas the industry-composition of local workers has increased importance over household 
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is useful in isolating the word-of-mouth effect on investment decisions. 
3.4 Do Lagged Purchases in One Neighborhood Predict Purchases in Another Neighborhood? 
In our final analysis, we explore whether lagged purchases in one neighborhood predict the 
purchases in another neighborhood. Up to this point, we focused primarily on relating household 
investment decisions to those made by their immediate neighbors. Figure 1 shows that purchases 
made by a household are related not only to those made in the immediate community, but also, to 
some extent, to those made in more distant communities. However, as one might suspect, and as 
is confirmed in Figure 1, a household’s purchases of non-local stocks are more sensitive to the 
decisions made by members of more distant communities than its purchases of local stocks are. 
That is, going beyond the 50-mile community leads to a substantially faster decline in 
information diffusion effects in the domain of local stocks than in the domain of non-local 
stocks. Simply put, households are relatively less likely to be influenced by non-locals when 
making their local stock picks. 
Thus, a natural place to look for dissemination of information across communities is in a 
household’s purchase of non-local stocks. In particular, do the financial decisions of nearby 
households have less of an effect over time, whereas the decisions made by more distant 
households have increasing influence over time? To examine this issue, we use the same 150-
mile area surrounding a given household we employed to produce the results in Figure 1. We 
relate the composition of a household’s quarterly purchases of non-local stocks across industries 
to the contemporaneous purchases and prior purchases (with a one-quarter and two-quarter lag) 
made by the households in the immediate 50-mile neighborhood as well as those located 50-150 
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around the immediate 50-mile community). 
Figure 2 illustrates information diffusion effects across distance from the household and 
time since purchase. Whereas the effects of the immediate 50-mile community and the 
households contained in the first ring surrounding the immediate community decline 
monotonically over time, the influence of the purchases made by the households contained in the 
second ring (the area farthest from the household) actually increase over time. In other words, 
whereas the contemporaneous purchases made by a household’s closest neighbors have a larger 
impact on one’s own purchases than the decisions made by those neighbors one or two quarters 
ago, the reverse is true for the effect of more distant households’ investment choices on a given 
household—the purchases made by the more distant households one and two quarters ago have a 
larger effect on a given household’s purchases this quarter than those made by the households 
from distant communities contemporaneously. Indeed, our unreported tests suggest that the 
difference over time in the information diffusion effects of both the immediate 50-mile 
community and the first ring are statistically different from those of the more distant second 
ring.
14 To be clear, a household’s immediate neighbors always have a bigger influence on its 
purchases than distant neighbors do (whether measured contemporaneously, with a one-quarter 
lag, or with a two-quarter lag). However, the pattern of information diffusion effects across time 
and space is broadly consistent with a gradual dissemination of information from one community 
to another. 
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We focus on the relation between the investment choices made by an individual investor’s 
neighborhood (households located within 50 miles from the investor) and the investor’s own 
investment choices. Using a detailed set of common-stock investments that nearly 36,000 
households made in the period from 1991 to 1996, we find strong evidence of information 
diffusion: baseline estimates suggest that a ten percentage-point increase in purchases of stocks 
from an industry made by a household’s neighbors is associated with a two percentage point 
increase in the household’s own purchases of stocks from that industry, with the effect larger for 
local stock purchases.   
The findings are robust to controls for inside information effects, domination of a single 
company (industry) in the neighborhood, and household fixed effects. In sum, there is strong 
evidence that individuals’ stock purchase decisions are related to those made by their neighbors. 
The strength of the information diffusion effect is considerable; for example, investors in more 
populous areas, where, on average, there are many more local investment choices, still are very 
concentrated in their purchases. To the extent that their investment choices are related to their 
neighbors’, the information diffusion effect is likely at least partially responsible for individual 
investors’ lack of diversification. 
Putting our results in perspective and comparing them with the findings from Feng and 
Seasholes (2004) delivers a new, richer understanding of the different mechanisms that govern 
individuals’ investment decisions across various societies. Whereas Feng and Seasholes (2004) 
report that individual investors’ correlated investment decisions are driven by common reaction 
to locally-available news, with no evidence of word-of-mouth effects among Chinese investors, 
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particularly in the more social areas. This discrepancy likely reflects differences in civil liberties 
and in the extent of presence of open and free discussion across the two societies. Exploring the 
role of societal characteristics in portfolio decisions appears to be a fruitful area for further 
research. 
Our results, in conjunction with those of Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2005), suggest that 
word-of-mouth effects are a broad phenomenon that affects financial decisions made by both 
mutual fund managers and individual investors. Because word-of-mouth effects may create a 
dynamic exchange of information that could lead to a ripple effect of further information 
dissemination, which in turn may have an impact on stock prices, understanding the interplay 
between individual and institutional trading across time and space might yield insights into price 
dynamics in the stock market. 
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     36Footnotes
                                                 
1 Whereas this is a somewhat imprecise measure, to our knowledge the data that detail the geographic distribution of 
employees for each company are not available. Moreover, most value-relevant, strategically important information 
is likely concentrated at the company headquarters. 
2 For example, according to the 1990 Census, 88% of the population lives within 25 miles of work (98% live within 
50 miles). Moreover, if two co-workers each live only 25 miles from work, they may live as many as 50 miles apart. 
3 Robert D. Putnam’s “Bowling Alone” (2000) features 14 state-level measures of social capital, such as time spent 
visiting friends, number of organizations per capita, number of group memberships, and trust in people, along with 
the specific measure we use in the paper, the Comprehensive Social Capital Index. Details are described in their 
book (see Table 4 and pp. 290-291). The data are available from 
http://www.bowlingalone.com/data.php3. 
4 To date, researchers have employed a few different sociability measures. For example, in their study of the relation 
between social interaction and stock market participation, Hong, Kubik, and Stein (2004) use church attendance as a 
proxy for sociability. 
5 Note that, by construction, for every h and every t,  Σi=1, …,14 fh,t,i  = 100. 
6 If regressions are estimated for each quarter separately, in which case each quarterly regression only has 14 
dummy variables for the industry effects, the estimated coefficient β is highly statistically significant in all twenty-
three regressions. Quarterly regressions suggest that information diffusion effects are strong throughout the sample 
period, with point estimates ranging from 13.6 to 28.3 across the 23 quarters. 
7 In the regressions for local buys we discarded all the h,t,i observations for which there were no firms in industry i 
within 50 miles from household h in quarter t because household h simply could not have invested into industry i 
locally. 
8 In unreported analyses, we have verified that conclusions drawn for the subsequent analyses in the paper regarding 
households’ purchase decisions hold for sales and holdings as well (results available upon request). 
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9 Firms are divided into 14 industry groups. Thus, a community with equal representation across all industries would 
have a local firm Herfindahl index of 0.07. 
10 In some robustness checks we also consider key components of the overall social capital index such as measures 
of the time spent visiting friends, number of organizations per capita, number of group memberships, and trust in 
people. Results are highly consistent with those based on the specifications that employ the Comprehensive Social 
Capital Index. 
11 Our measure of the industry composition of the local labor force is based on the composition of employees at 
publicly-traded companies, which we obtain from COMPUSTAT. For the purpose of this analysis we assume that 
all the company’s employees are employed in the same county in which the company headquarters is located. This is 
a somewhat imprecise measure, but, to our knowledge, more precise panel data regarding the geographic 
distribution of the employees for each company are not available. 
12 We attribute the small discrepancies between the point estimates (e.g., 19.9 in Table 5 vs. 20.7 in Table 2 for all 
buys) to the differing numbers of observations, that is, to the different samples employed in the respective analyses. 
13 This is a very robust estimate. Inspection of quarterly estimates (unreported for brevity) suggests that word-of-
mouth communication accounts for 40% to 50% of the overall information diffusion effect (i.e., correlation of 
household stock purchases with that of their neighbors) in the vast majority of quarters, with a range of 21% to 56%. 
14 The regression specification underlying the results displayed in Figure 2 is similar to Equation (2). However, 
instead of focusing only on contemporaneous purchases made by other households within 50 miles, we now relate 
the composition of a given household’s purchases not only to those made by other households within 50 miles, but 
also to those located 50-150 miles away (for simplicity, divided into two rings of equal area around the immediate 
50-mile community).  The regression specification allows purchases made by surrounding communities to affect a 
given household’s purchase of non-local stocks contemporaneously, with a one-quarter lag, and with a two-quarter 
lag: 
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     39Table 1 
Quarterly Purchases of Stock by Households 
  # Purchases # Distinct HHs
Mean Quarterly 
purchase (in $) 
[Median] 
% Local 
1991 36,250  20,366  23,242 
[7,113]  16.4 
1992 36,270  20,300  23,576 
[7,500]  17.0 
1993 34,377  18,894  25,150 
[7,500]  16.4 
1994 28,726  16,307  25,418 
[7,388]  17.4 
1995 30,299  16,134  38,540 




25,364 15,483  42,277 
[9,725]  17.5 
TOTAL 191,286  35,673  28,922 
[7,949]  17.1 
 
This table summarizes quarterly household stock purchases at the industry level. Summary statistics are 
reported annually from 1991 to 1996, as well as for the entire sample period (bottom row of the table). 
The first column presents the number of household, quarter, industry (h, t, i) combinations in a given year 
such that household h made at least one purchase in quarter t in industry i. The second column tallies the 
number of distinct households appearing in the sample in a given year. The third column lists average 
dollar values of households’ quarterly purchases, where median values are reported in parentheses 
directly underneath the mean values. The last column breaks down the purchases according to their 
distance from the household (i.e., whether the firm headquarters is located within 50 miles of the 
household). 
     40Table 2 
Information Diffusion for Purchases, Sales, and Positions 
 
  Composition of 
HH Variable ≤ 50 miles R
2 # obs. 




















































































This table presents the results of fitting the basic information diffusion regression from Equation (2) over 
the 23 quarters from January of 1991 to October 1996: 
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Panel A reports regression results relating the composition of households’ stock purchases across 14 
broad industry groups to the composition of their communities’ purchases (the community is defined as 
all other households within 50 miles). Analogously, Panels B and C present regression results for the 
composition of sales and positions, respectively. Regressions in all three panels are estimated on 
subsamples identified by the distance from households to company headquarters (All, Local, and Non-
Local). Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for heteroskedasticity, as well as correlation of error 
terms at the household-quarter level. 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3 
Information Diffusion for Purchases with Population Interactions 
  Composition of  
HH Buys ≤ 50 miles  R
2 # obs. 
All Buys 
Population in millions     














   





   





   
Local Buys 
Population in millions 












   





   





   
Non-Local Buys 
Population in millions 












   





   





   
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
This table presents the results of fitting a diffusion regression for purchases, a variant of Equation (2) that 
distinguishes among households according to the size of the population that resides within 50 miles of 
them into four categories and assesses information diffusion effects in neighborhoods of various sizes: 
The four categories are: 0-1 million, 1-2.5 million, 2.5-5 million, and more than 5 million residents. 
Regressions are estimated on subsamples identified by the type of purchase (All Buys, Local Buys, and 
Non-Local Buys). The coefficient estimates for a particular population group represents the overall 
information diffusion effect for that group (i.e., the sum of the diffusion effect for the 0-1 million group 
and the interaction term for that particular population group). Standard errors, shown in parentheses, 
allow for heteroskedasticity, as well as correlation of error terms at the household-quarter level. 
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  Table 4 
Information Diffusion, Area Sociability, and Area Population 
  Population in millions 
  Full Sample  0 – 1  1 – 2.5  2.5 – 5  5+    R
2 # obs. 
  Panel A: All Buys   




                      0.147 2,634,338
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles *  





                      

















Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles *  
Sociability Above Median 
















  Panel B: Local Buys 




               0.236 566,735
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles *  





              

















Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles *  
Sociability Above Median 
















  Panel C: Non-Local Buys 




               0.129 2,295,090
Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles *  





              

















Buys of HHs ≤ 50 miles *  
Sociability Above Median 
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Table 4 
Information Diffusion, Area Sociability, and Area Population (continued) 
This table presents results of stratifying households according to the sociability of the state to which the household belongs and the size of the 
population that resides within 50 miles of the household into eight categories and assessing information diffusion effects in neighborhoods of 
various sociability and size by running the following regression (a variant of Equation (2)): 
i t h
ti
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To capture sociability, we use state-level values of the Comprehensive Social Capital Index (available for all 50 states except Alaska and Hawaii), 
as collected and presented in Putnam (2000). We classify households according to their state’s Comprehensive Social Capital Index and split the 
sample of households into sociable and non-sociable ones, where the breakpoint is the sociability measure of the median household in the sample. 
The four population categories are: 0-1 million, 1-2.5 million, 2.5-5 million, and more than 5 million residents. Regressions are estimated on 
subsamples selected by the type of purchase and presented in three panels accordingly (All Buys, Local Buys, and Non-Local Buys). Panel A 
presents results based on the sample of all buys, whereas Panels B and C focus only on local and non-local buys, respectively. Each panel presents 
results of fitting two specifications. The first specification only features the sociability measure (without controls for the local population), whereas 
the second one is the full specification as outlined above. As in Table 2, Panel B, the coefficient estimates presented for a particular population 
group represents the overall information diffusion effect for that group (i.e., the sum of the diffusion effect for the 0-1 million group and the 
interaction term for that particular population group). Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for heteroskedasticity, as well as correlation of 
error terms at the household-quarter level. 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
  Table 5 
Information Diffusion, Correlated Preferences for Industry Allocation, and Structure of 
Local Economy 
Composition of... 
Buys  Buys of HHs 
≤ 50 miles 
 Positions of HHs 








2 # obs. 
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  0.186 1,510,390
Non-Local  7.0
(0.4)




























  45 Table 5 
Information Diffusion, Correlated Preferences for Industry Allocation, and Structure of 
Local Economy (Continued) 
Composition of... 
Buys  Buys of HHs 
≤ 50 miles 
 Positions of HHs 








2 # obs. 
Panel B: Similar HH Portfolios (Average Absolute Deviation in Industry Positions from HHs 
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Panel C: Disparate HH Portfolios (Average Absolute Deviation in Industry Positions from HHs 
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  46 Table 5 
Information Diffusion, Correlated Preferences for Industry Allocation, and Structure of 
Local Economy (Continued) 
This table presents results of assessing the contribution of word-of-mouth effects to the overall 
information diffusion effect (i.e., correlation of household stock purchases with that of their neighbors). 
Accordingly, we regress households’ industry-level purchases on neighbors’ purchases, variables 
capturing correlated preferences for industry allocation, variables capturing the structure of the local 
economy, and 322 industry-time dummy variables (a variant of Equation (2)). Two variables for each (h, 
t) observation are used to capture correlated preferences. First, we define the industry composition of 
stock positions of neighboring households (excluding household h itself) at the end of quarter t–1. 
Second, we define the industry composition of stock positions of the household itself at the end of quarter 
t–1. To capture the impact of the structure of the local economy, for each (h, t, i) observation we define 
two variables: the fraction of market value of companies local to household h in quarter t in industry i and 
the fraction of the labor force local to household h in quarter t employed in industry i. In this framework, 
estimates of β are conservative lower bounds on the contribution of word-of-mouth effects to the overall 
information diffusion effect. Panel A has three sections, containing estimates for all buys, local buys, and 
non-local buys, respectively. Within each section, we first show the baseline result (i.e., Equation (2)). 
The following row in each section shows the results with the two additional independent variables that 
seek to capture preferences for industry allocation. The third row in each section of Panel A includes the 
variables that capture the structure of the local economy. The fourth row in each section features the 
results of relating the industry composition of a household’s investments to both preferences (the 
neighborhood’s and own) and the structure of the local economy. The final analysis, reported in the fifth 
row in each section, seeks to capture differences among households along unobservable characteristics by 
running the baseline regression from Equation (2) with the inclusion of household-industry-level fixed 
effects. Panels B and C show results of replicating the key analyses from Panel A on two subsamples of 
households. Specifically, we sort households into two types according to the extent to which their 
household portfolio allocations at the industry level conform to those of their neighbors; the metric we use 
is the average absolute deviation in industry portfolio shares between a household and its neighborhood. 
Standard errors, shown in parentheses, allow for heteroskedasticity, as well as correlation of error terms at 
the household-quarter level. 
***, 
**, 
* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
+ denotes that the difference in coefficients across the similar and disparate samples is not significant at 
the one percent level. 
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Figure 1: Dissipation of Information Diffusion. The figure illustrates dissipation of information 
diffusion effects with distance from the household. Regions surrounding the household at increasingly 
larger distances have the same geographic area (50
2 π = 7,854 square miles). The regression specification 
is similar to Equation (2), except, instead of having one information diffusion regressor, the specification 
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Figure 2: Information Diffusion Effects Associated with Investments in Non-Local Stocks Across 
Time and Space. The figure illustrates information diffusion effects by distance from the household and 
time since purchase. The regression specification underlying the figure is similar to Equation (2). 
However, instead of focusing only on contemporaneous purchases made by other households within 50 
miles, we now relate the composition of a given household’s purchases not only to those made by other 
households within 50 miles, but also to those located 50-150 miles away (for simplicity, divided into two 
rings of equal area around the immediate 50-mile community).  The regression specification allows 
purchases made by surrounding communities to affect a given household’s purchase of non-local stocks 
contemporaneously, with a one-quarter lag, and with a two-quarter lag. 
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